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For over thirty years, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) has
required financial institutions to maintain records and to make certain
reports to federal regulators to assist in various criminal, tax or
regulatory proceedings. In this fashion, financial institutions play an
integral role in detecting money laundering of illicit funds. After the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, new laws and regulations were
issued to address money-laundering and terrorist financing, thus,
increasing the role of financial institutions in preventing such activity.
As set forth in the recent "Statement of Offense" involving the plea
agreement by Riggs Bank N.A., "[firom the U.S. government's
perspective, the BSA regulatory regime constitutes law enforcement's
first defense against the misuse of the U.S. financial system by money
launderers and terrorist financiers."2
This article explores the increasing perils to financial
institutions whose anti-money laundering efforts and programs are
deficient. In Part II, the article provides a brief overview of the
statutory and regulatory regime governing money laundering. In Part
III, the article examines two actions brought against banks that resulted
in substantial administrative civil money penalties, and also, in one
case, resulted in a criminal fine. In Part IV, the article examines the
cases involving four other banks that have faced criminal actions based
on the failure to file required reports under the BSA. The actions that
1. Robert S. Pasley is an Assistant Director of the Enforcement & Compliance
Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The views expressed in this
article are Mr. Pasley's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency.
2. Statement of Offense at 1, U.S. v. Riggs Bank N.A., Cr. 05-35 RMU (D.D.C.
settled Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/350847/
000095013305000259/wO517Oexv lOw 1 .htm [hereinafter Riggs Statement of Offense].
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led to these charges are explored in detail, as well as some of the
controversy involving these cases. In Part V, the article concludes that
the cases illustrate the necessity for financial institutions to have a
strong BSA compliance programs in place, and provides specific
suggestions for how to design and implement such programs.
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
Banks are required, pursuant to the BSA, to file a Suspicious
Activity Report ("SAR") whenever they detect possible violations of
criminal law or suspicious activity, as set forth below. This requirement
replaced the criminal referral process and became effective on April 1,
1996.'
In summary, a bank is required to report a transaction
conducted, or attempted to be conducted, through the bank (subject to
certain monetary thresholds) if the bank knows, suspects, or has reason
to suspect that:
a. the bank was an actual or potential victim of a criminal
violation;
b. the transaction involved funds derived from illegal activities
or was intended or was conducted in order to hide or
disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activities as
part of a plan to violate or evade any federal law or
regulations or to avoid any transaction reporting
requirement under federal law;
c. the transaction was designed to evade any regulations
promulgated under the BSA; or
d. the transaction had no business or apparent lawful purpose
or was not the sort in which the particular customer would
normally be expected to engage and the bank knows of no
reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining




the available facts, including the background and possible
purpose of the transaction.
In addition to the requirement to file SARs, banks are required,
pursuant to the BSA, to file a Currency Transaction Report ("CTR") for
each non-exempt deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other
payment or transfer by, through, or to the bank that involves currency of
more than $10,000. 4 Banks are also required to verify and record on a
CTR the true name and address of the individual presenting the
transaction, as well as the true nature of the entity or person on whose
behalf the transaction is effected.
III. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES UNDER
THE BSA
The bank regulatory agencies and FinCEN may seek civil
money penalties for violations of the BSA. Two cases, one involving
UBS and one involving Riggs Bank, resulted in record civil money
penalties of $100 million and a $25 million, respectively.
A. UBS Case
In April 2003, United States armed forces seized the palace of
Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. This was, of course, an important
military and psychological development in the war in Iraq. It also led,
however, to a strange development in the fight against money
laundering. Unexpectedly, the armed forces found $650 million in
United States currency in neat stacks of $100 bills placed in 164 metal
boxes, all riveted shut. 5 Most of the money was new, sequentially
numbered and still in its shrink-wrapped containers.
6 The initial
question, of course, was: how did the money get there?
Within days of the currency being discovered, the New York
Federal Reserve Bank ("NY Fed") had obtained a sample of serial
4. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (2004); 31 C.F.R. § 103.28
(2004).
5. Michael R. Gordan, A Nation At War: Baghdad Hoard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003,
at B3.
6. Timothy L. O'Brien, Lockboxes, Iraqi Loot and a Trail To the Fed, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2004, § 3 (Sunday Business), at 1.
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numbers from the money and had traced the money to shipments of
U.S. banknotes to three banks: HSBC in London, Bank of America in
Zurich and UBS in Zurich.7 The shipments were made in conjunction
with a program entitled "Extended Custodial Inventory," or "ECI.' 8
This program began in 1996 and is managed by the Federal Reserve in
order to facilitate, monitor and control the international distribution of
U.S. banknotes. 9 This is a particularly important function in light of the
fact that almost two-thirds of the dollar value of all U.S. banknotes is in
circulation overseas.' ° As a result, only five specifically selected banks
are permitted to participate in the program."
During the course of investigating this matter, the NY Fed
received a report from UBS in June 2003, indicating that the bank had
made eight shipments of U.S. banknotes to Iran, a country (like Iraq)
that was on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list of
sanctioned countries. 12 UBS claimed that the eight shipments to Iran
and the bank's failure to report the shipments on the bank's monthly
reports to the Fed "were the result of an innocent mistake."' 3 In order to
explore this development further, the NY Fed had UBS direct its outside
auditor, Ernst and Young, to perform a more thorough review.1 4 E&Y
determined that, in fact, UBS had also engaged in banknote transactions
with Cuba, another OFAC sanctioned country, and that UBS had
similarly failed to report this to the NY Fed.'5
In October and November 2003, UBS finally acknowledged that
it had also engaged in prohibited banknote transactions with Libya and
the former country of Yugoslavia (currently the Republics of Serbia and
7. Oversight of the Extended Custodial Inventory Program: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 10 8th Cong. 5-6 (2004) (testimony of
Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York), available at http://banking.senate.gov/-files/baxter.pdf (last visited
Jan. 2, 2005)[hereinafter Baxter].
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Baxter, supra note 7, at 6-7. Engaging in transactions with OFAC listed countries
was specifically prohibited by the ECI Agreement the Fed had with each of the custodial
banks participating in the program. Id.
13. Id. at 7.




Montenegro).' 6  In other words, UBS had engaged in prohibited
transactions with four OFAC listed countries and had not disclosed any
of the transactions to the Federal Reserve. 7
The NY Fed ultimately determined that, far from these
transactions being "an innocent mistake," UBS had consistently
engaged in these transactions from the inception of the ECI program,
had taken affirmative actions to conceal the transactions from the NY
Fed, had falsified its monthly reports to the NY Fed and had even
continued the concealment and deception long after the commencement
of the investigation into the discovery of the U.S. banknotes in the
palace of Saddam Hussein.' 8 The deception had persisted over the
course of eight years.' 9
As a result of UBS's conduct, the Federal Reserve, in October
2003, terminated its ECI agreement with UBS. 20  This alone was a
severe rebuke for UBS. On May 10, 2004, however, the Federal
Reserve followed up with a record breaking civil money penalty of
$100 million against UBS.21 The Federal Reserve justified the amount
of this penalty, in part, by pointing to the size of UBS ($1 trillion), its
aggregate net profits of $87 million for all banknote transactions for all
currencies with all countries and its net profit of $5 million with the four
countries noted above.22 The Federal Reserve also analogized to the
$100 million civil money penalty it had assessed against Credit
Lyonnais for engaging in a "similar pattern of deliberate and repeated
false statements to the Federal Reserve" in connection with that bank's
undisclosed acquisition of another company.23 Not reflected in the
public statements or documents, but potentially a contributing factor in
arriving at the large dollar amount, was the fact that a brokerage
subsidiary of UBS had been sanctioned by the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom in 2001 with the then second
16. Id. at 8-9.
17. Baxter, supra note 7, at 10.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Federal Reserve Board Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty, In the
Matter of UBS, AG, Bd. Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. at 3 (May 10, 2004), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/Enforcement/
2 00 4/2 00 405102/attachmen
t.pdf [hereinafter Federal Reserve UBS Assessment].
22. Baxter, supra note 7, at 11-12.
23. Id. at 12.
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largest fine (350 pounds - or approximately $510,000 at the time) ever
imposed by the FSA for having poor anti-money laundering controls.24
While this sanction was for conduct in 1998 and 1999, approximately
11 months prior to UBS acquiring the subsidiary, the charges
themselves were brought nine months after UBS's acquisition of the
subsidiary.25
The Federal Reserve's civil money penalty document against
UBS indicates that the $100 million penalty was for: (1) engaging in
"U.S. dollar banknote transactions through the Zurich ECI with
counterparties in jurisdictions subject to sanctions by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
specifically, Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Yugoslavia;" and (2) engaging "in
intentional acts aimed at concealing those banknote transactions from
the Reserve Bank, including, but not limited to, the falsification of
monthly reports submitted by UBS to the Reserve Bank., 26 However,
in his testimony ten days after the assessment was levied, Mr. Baxter
indicated that the remedy for the actual breach of the ECI Agreement
was the termination of the ECI Agreement with UBS.27 He indicated
that the $100 million penalty was solely to punish UBS for its
deception.28
One obvious moral to take away from this case is that one
should not lie to or try to deceive one's regulator. But that is overly
simplistic. While this case was very unusual, involving a huge amount
of money, a highly visible and sensitive international matter, U.S.
banknote transactions in foreign countries handled by only five large
banks, and a program that "is critical to ensuring the quality of U.S.
currency abroad,' 29 it lends itself to some fundamental principles
applicable to all banks.
First, UBS's failures indicate a lack of internal controls that
24. Emily Church, PaineWebber UK Fined for Lax Money Laundering Control, CBS
MARKET WATCH, Aug. 9, 2001. at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?
guid={0f9e2417-093a-434f-bcdd02c280b I fd2c }&siteid=mktw&dist=SignInArchive&
narchive=true&param=archive&garden=&minisite=; Jill Treanor, Regulator Fines US
Broker £350,000 pounds, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 8, 2001, at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/print/0,358,4243952-103676,00.html.
25. Treanor, supra note 24.
26. Federal Reserve UBS Assessment, supra note 21, at 1-2.
27. Baxter, supra note 7, at 11.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
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should have been in place to prevent the illegal transactions. A properly
designed set of controls should have been able to preclude the bank
from engaging in multiple transactions with Iran and three other OFAC
sanctioned countries. Second, the case reflects a lack of a proper audit
that should have discovered, much earlier than it did, the fact that the
bank's monthly reports to the Federal Reserve were false. Clearly, the
bank had internal reports that reflected the eight shipments to Iran given
the fact that these reports were belatedly disclosed to the NY Fed. In
addition, there were reports which enabled E&Y to determine that the
bank had engaged in additional banknote transactions with Cuba. An
adequate audit function should have been in place to review and to
analyze these reports and to bring them to the attention of the board of
directors of the bank. Third, UBS's failures underscore a lack of
training. In order for the bank to have engaged in these transactions
over an eight-year period, a number of employees had to have been
involved. For this to have persisted for as long as it did, there had to
have been a carelessness, at best, in training employees to ensure that
they understood the nature of the restrictions in the ECI program and
the importance of adhering to them.
Internal controls, audit and training are, of course, three of the
four fundamental requirements for a BSA program.3° UBS, it appears,
failed to have any of these in place. What is significant in this regard is
the Federal Reserve's decision to allow the other two banks which were
linked to the U.S. banknotes found in Iraq - HSBC and Bank of
America - to continue with the ECI program because, according to Mr.
Baxter, the Federal Reserve was sufficiently comfortable with those
banks' procedures for compliance with OFAC regulations and anti-
money laundering statutes and regulations.31
In order for any bank to have the proper policies and procedures
in place, it must have proper direction from senior management and the
board of directors. Conversely, even if a bank has all the right policies
and procedures in theory, if the culture instilled in the bank by the board
and senior management is not sufficiently strong and supportive of a
comprehensive compliance regime, those policies and procedures will
ultimately have little effect. The result will likely be adverse not only
30. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2004).
31. Baxter, supra note 7, at 13.
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for the bank, but also for the board. Very simply, if the direction and
commitment to compliance is not taken seriously, emphasized and
communicated from the board and senior management, it will not be
adequately received, understood and adhered to throughout the bank.
B. Riggs Case
Three days after the Federal Reserve issued its $100 million
civil money penalty against UBS, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, together with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), assessed Riggs Bank NA, McLean, Virginia, a civil money
penalty of $25 million.
32
According to the OCC's Press Release, "the bank had failed to
implement an effective anti-money laundering program. As a result, it
did not detect or investigate suspicious transactions and had not filed
Suspicious Activity Reports as required under the law."3 3 As set forth
more completely in its "Consent Order of Civil Money Penalty" against
Riggs, the OCC found that the bank had failed to comply with all four
elements required of a BSA compliance program.34 FinCEN, in its
"Assessment of Civil Money Penalty," echoed the OCC's findings:
FinCEN has determined that Riggs willfully violated the
suspicious activity and currency transaction reporting
requirements of the BSA and its implementing
regulations, and that Riggs has willfully violated the
anti-money laundering program... requirement of the
BSA and its implementing regulations. The violations
Riggs engaged in were systemic - Riggs was deficient
in designing a program tailored to the risks of its
32. Press Release, Office of Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses $25 Million
Penalty Against Riggs Bank N.A. (May 13, 2004), at http://www.occ.treas.
gov/scripts/newsrelease.aspxDoc=5AOFP8K.xml [hereinafter OCC Riggs Press Release];
Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Assesses $25 million Civil
Money Penalty Against Riggs Bank N.A. (May 13, 2004), at http://www.
fincen.gov/riggs6.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN Riggs Press Release].
33. OCC Riggs Press Release, supra note 32.
34. Office of Comptroller of the Currency Consent Order of Civil Money Penalty No.
2004-04, In the Matter of Riggs Bank N.A., O.C.C. at 3 (May 13, 2004), available at




business that would ensure appropriate reporting,
implementing the procedures it did have, and responding
to classic "red flags" of suspicious conduct.
35
With regard to internal controls - the first required component
of a BSA program - the OCC found that:
The Bank's internal controls were.. .seriously deficient.
The Bank's system of internal controls did not
effectively identify or address the BSA-related risks that
existed in various divisions of the Bank or that related to
customers, products, services, or accounts that should
have been viewed as high risk. Moreover, the Bank's
Anti-Money Laundering and Enhanced Due Diligence
program and Customer Identification Program
pertaining to areas deemed to be high-risk were not
adequately implemented.36
Similarly, FinCEN found that:
Riggs' internal controls were not designed to take into
account the exposure posed by the customers, products,
services, and accounts from high-risk international
geographic locations that are commonly viewed as high-
risk for money laundering.... Riggs did not implement
an effective system to identify and assess the BSA/AML
risk present throughout the institution.37
With regard to testing - the second required component of a
BSA program - the OCC found that the bank's system of testing for
BSA compliance was inadequate: "Bank audits did not review all of the
necessary areas, did not uncover or disclose the severity or the extent of
35. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In the
Matter of Riggs Bank, N.A., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network at 1-2 (May 13, 2004),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/riggsassessment3.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN Riggs
Assessment].
36. OCC Consent Order 2004-44, supra note 34, at 3.
37. FinCEN Riggs Assessment, supra note 35, at 2.
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weaknesses in the Bank's BSA compliance, and contained flawed
testing and sampling. 38  Similarly, FinCEN determined that the
"independent testing for compliance with the BSA was neither timely
nor effective for the level of risk within Riggs. 39
Along these same lines, the OCC and FinCEN found the bank to
be in non-compliance with the last two components required of a BSA
program: designation of a compliance officer and training. With regard
to the former, it was determined that:
Riggs also lacked effective monitoring for compliance
by the BSA officer. Day-to-day oversight and
monitoring of high-risk transactions, high-risk
customers, and high-risk geographies were minimal.
Strategies and alternative measures to ensure ongoing
BSA/AML monitoring for suspicious transactions were
not adequately developed and applied.4 °
It is important to note here that the OCC's and FinCEN's
criticisms of the bank's BSA compliance program were not made in a
vacuum. As set forth in the OCC's Consent Order with Riggs, the
bank's deficiencies contributed to the bank's failure to properly detect,
investigate and file complete and accurate SARs.4' In addition, the bank
did not adequately monitor for "suspicious cash, wire, or monetary
instrument transactions ' 42 and, as a result, failed to identify or monitor
potentially suspicious activity pertaining to:
* tens of millions of dollars in cash withdrawals from
accounts related to the Saudi Arabian embassy;
" dozens of sequentially-numbered international drafts that
totaled millions of dollars, that were drawn from accounts
related to officials of Saudi Arabia, and that were returned
to the bank;
38. OCC Consent Order 2004-44, supra note 34, at 4.
39. FinCEN Riggs Assessment, supra note 35, at 3.
40. Id. at 4.




" dozens of sequentially-numbered cashier's checks that were
drawn from accounts related to officials of Saudi Arabia
made payable to the account holder;
* millions of dollars deposited into a private investment
company 43 owned by an official of Equatorial Guinea, a
small county on the west coast of Africa;
" hundreds of thousands of dollars transferred from an
account for Equatorial Guinea to the personal account of a
government official of that country; and
" over a million dollars transferred from an account for
Equatorial Guinea to a private investment company owned
by Riggs' relationship manager responsible for monitoring
the Equatorial Guinea accounts. 44
While the above information is set forth fairly graphically in the
OCC's and FinCEN's relatively short documents, the Minority Staff of
the U.S. Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ("PSI")
set forth the issues at the bank in much more detail in its 113 page
report entitled "Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption:
Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act; Case Study Involving
Riggs Bank. 45
With regard to the bank's handling of Equatorial Guinea, the
PSI report drew the following negative conclusions:
43. Riggs Statement of Offense, supra note 2, at 8. As noted in the Department of
Justice's Statement of Offense, "The OCC, in its Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering
Comptroller's Handbook, described the special risks involved with PICs: 'PICs are
incorporated frequently in countries that impose low or no taxes on company assets and
operations or are bank secrecy havens. Id. Banks should exercise extra care when dealing
with beneficial owners of PICs and associated trusts because they can be misused to
camouflage illegal activities."' id.
44. OCC Consent Order 2004-44, supra note 34, at 6.
45. MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
Gov't AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN
CORRUPTION: ENFORCEMENT & EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PATRIOT ACT--CASE STUDY
INVOLVING RIGGS BANK (COMM. PRINT 1950), available at http://hsgac.
senate.gov/-files/ACF5F8.pdf (July 15, 2004) [hereinafter PSI report].
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The Subcommittee investigation... determined that,
from1995 until 2004, Riggs Bank administered more
than 60 accounts and CDs for the Government of
Equatorial Guinea (E.G.), E.G. government officials, or
their family members. By 2003, the E.G. accounts
represented the largest relationship at Riggs Bank, with
aggregate deposits ranging from $400 to $700 million at
a time. The Subcommittee investigation has determined
that Riggs Bank serviced the E.G. accounts with little or
no attention to the bank's anti-money laundering
obligations, turned a blind eye to evidence suggesting
the bank was handling the proceeds of foreign
corruption, and allowed numerous suspicious
transactions to take place without notifying law
enforcement.... Riggs... over a three year period,
from 2000 to 2002, facilitated nearly $13 million in cash
deposits into Riggs accounts controlled by the E.G.
President and his wife. On two of those occasions,
Riggs accepted without due diligence $3 million in cash
deposits for an account opened in the name of the E.G.
President's offshore shell corporation, Otong, S.A.
.... Riggs subsequently allowed wire transfers
withdrawing more than $35 million from the E.G.
government account, wiring the funds to two companies
which were unknown to the bank and had accounts in
jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws .... The senior
leadership at Riggs Bank were well aware of the E.G.
accounts and met on several occasions with the E.G.
President and other E.G. officials. The bank leadership
permitted the account manager handling the E.G.
relationship to become closely involved with E.G.
officials and business activities, including advising the
E.G. government of financial matters and becoming the
sole signatory on an E.G. account holding substantial
funds. The bank exercised such lax oversight of the
account manager's activities that, among other
misconduct, the account manager was able to wire
[Vol. 9
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transfer more than $1 million from the E.G. oil account
at Riggs to another bank for an account opened in the
name of Jadini Holdings, an offshore corporation
controlled by the account manager's wife.46
PSI also noted that Riggs continued to do business with
Equatorial Guinea with inadequate oversight and controls in spite of the
fact "Riggs was clearly aware of the corruption concerns associated
with Equatorial Guinea., 47 In addition, PSI pointed out that $11.5
million of the cash deposits referenced above, that were made on behalf
of the President of Equatorial Guinea, were actually physically brought
into the bank on six different days over the course of two years by the
Riggs officer who was the relationship manager for the Equatorial
Guinea accounts.4 8 The cash was brought into the bank in increments of
$1-$3 million in "unopened, plastic-wrapped bundles., 49 PSI estimated
that the $3 million in cash weighed approximately 60 pounds.50 So,
according to the PSI report, there was an account relationship manager
depositing 60 pounds of shrink-wrapped cash on a periodic basis on
behalf of a bank customer with no explanation or review or after-the-
fact analysis or audit. And this was the account manager who had the
authority to wire transfer more than $1 million from an Equatorial
Guinea account to another bank and over whom there was very "lax
oversight."'', This, unfortunately, was a formula for disaster and Riggs
has had to pay a severe price.
On behalf of the bank, it should be noted that it was well aware
of the Equatorial Guinea account relationship and, in 2001, as the PSI
report noted, "several senior Riggs Board members and bank officers
formed a high level committee which met quarterly each year to provide
special attention to the E.G. relationship. 52 However, it would appear
that the "high level committee" provided inadequate oversight for the
relationship and focused, perhaps, too much on how to grow the account
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 51. Shades, unfortunately, of UBS aRE clearly very suspicious.
50. PSI report, supra note 45, at 51.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 64.
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relationship.53 The supervision and understanding of the account
relationship was so poor that, when the OCC asked for information
about the accounts and, later, when PSI subpoenaed the account
information, the bank could find and produce information for only 30 of
the 60 existing accounts for Equatorial Guinea.54  It took the OCC
examiners to find the other 30 accounts.55 Further, even though the
underlying transactions in the accounts were suspicious and the size and
nature of the relationship were questionable, Riggs did not identify the
accounts as high risk until October, 2003,56 several months after the
initial consent cease and desist order was entered into by the bank with
the OCC to address BSA issues.57
As set forth in the OCC and FinCEN documents and in the PSI
report, Riggs - in spite of the high risk nature of the accounts, the
possibility that the bank was assisting public corruption of behalf of a
foreign dictator and his family, and the various suspicious transactions
that occurred in the account relationship - failed to identify or monitor
the risk, failed to file required SARs with regard to the account
relationship and failed to provide sufficient supervision over the account
relationship manager.
Further, once these issues were brought to the bank's attention,
members of the board indicated an unwillingness to consider closing the
accounts.58 As late as December 17, 2003, Director Joseph Allbritton
was quoted as saying that "the bank had no intention of closing the E.G.
accounts. '59
In addition to the Equatorial Guinea account relationship, the
PSI report focused on Riggs' account relationship with Augusto
Pinochet, the former President of Chile, and drew these negative
conclusions:
53. See id.
54. Id. at 66; OCC Consent Order 2004-44, supra note 34, at 4; FinCEN Riggs
Assessment, supra note 35, at 3.
55. PSI report, supra note 45, at 66.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Office of Comptroller of the Currency Consent Order #2003-79, In the Matter of
Riggs Bank National Association, O.C.C. (July 16, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2003-79.pdf [hereinafter OCC Consent Order 2003-
79].
58. PSI report, supra note 45, at 66, 72.
59. Id. at 67, 83.
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The evidence obtained by the Subcommittee staff shows
that, from 1994 until 2002, Riggs Bank (Riggs) opened
at least six accounts and issued several certificates of
deposit (CDs) for Augusto Pinochet, former President of
Chile, while he was under house arrest in the United
Kingdom and his assets were the subject of court
proceedings. The aggregate deposits in the Pinochet
accounts at Riggs ranged from $4 to $8 million at a
time. The Subcommittee investigation had determined
that the bank's leadership directly solicited the accounts
from Mr. Pinochet, and Riggs account managers took
actions consistent with helping Mr. Pinochet to evade
legal proceedings seeking to discover and attach his
bank accounts. The Subcommittee investigation found
that Riggs opened multiple accounts and accepted
millions of dollars in deposits from Mr. Pinochet with
no serious inquiry into questions regarding the source or
his wealth; helped him set up offshore shell corporations
and open accounts in the names of those corporations to
disguise his control of the accounts; altered the names of
his personal accounts to disguise their ownership;
transferred $1.6 million from London to the United
States while Mr. Pinochet was in detention and the
subject of a court order to attach his bank accounts;
conducted transactions through Riggs' own accounts to
hide Mr. Pinochet's involvement in some cash
transactions; and delivered over $1.9 million in cashiers
checks to Mr. Pinochet in Chile to enable him to obtain
substantial cash payments from banks in that country.
The Subcommittee investigation also determined that
Riggs concealed the existence of the Pinochet accounts
from OCC bank examiners for two years, initially
resisted OCC requests for information, and closed the
accounts only after a targeted OCC examination in
2002.60
60. Id. at 2-3.
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Riggs Bank assisted Augusto Pinochet, former president
of Chile, to evade legal proceedings related to his Riggs
bank accounts and resisted OCC oversight of these
accounts, despite red flags involving the source of Mr.
Pinochet's wealth, pending legal proceedings to freeze
his assets, and public allegations of serious wrongdoing
by this client.
61
On March 24, 1999, the Law Lords authorized an
extradition hearing to determine whether Mr. Pinochet
should be transferred to Spain. Two days later, on
March 26, 1999, Riggs allowed Mr. Pinochet to
prematurely terminate the 1 million pound CD held in
the name of Althorp at Riggs in London, and transfer the
funds, totaling $1.6 million in U.S. dollars, to a new CD
in the United States.62
In spite of this litany, the bank, according to the PSI report,
again resisted closing the accounts. Specifically, Mrs. Allbritton, a
member of the bank's board, allegedly "complained to the OCC about
losing the Pinochet accounts. 63 As set forth by the PSI report with
regard to both the Pinochet and the Equatorial Guinea accounts:
The corporate culture at Riggs failed to communicate
the importance of the bank's anti-money laundering
program. The Subcommittee was told that the bank's
senior leadership clearly valued the Embassy accounts
and accounts opened for foreign leaders .... The 1994
trip to Chile by senior Board members to solicit the
Pinochet account and the 2001 luncheon in honor of the
Equatorial Guinea president illustrate the Board's
personal involvement in these accounts. In 2002 and
2003, some Board members expressed opposition to
closing the Pinochet and Equatorial Guinea accounts
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
63. PSI report, supra note 45, at 81.
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due to money laundering concerns. In March 2003,
senior bank officers complained to the OCC about
forcing the bank to adopt a rigorous AML program.
These are not the actions or sentiments of a Board
committed to AML excellence. 64
The bank's failure to establish and to adhere to an adequate
BSA program led not only to two cease and desist orders against the
bank and an extremely large civil money penalty, it also had other
ramifications. Specifically, on January 27, 2005, Riggs Bank pled
guilty to one count of violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5318(g) for
failure to file timely and accurate SARs with regard to the Equatorial
Guinea and the Pinochet matters detailed above.65 Many of the
deficiencies involving Pinochet's accounts noted by the OCC, FinCEN
and PSI were also detailed in the Department of Justice's Statement of
Offense. 66 For instance, the Department of Justice noted that Riggs
maintained numerous accounts for Equatorial Guinea and its senior
government officials; that the relationship was the bank's single largest,
with balances and loans totaling nearly $700 million; that there were
many allegations of corruption and abuse by the country's government;
and that there were numerous, suspicious, transactions involving the
Equatorial Guinea accounts.67 Similarly, the Department of Justice
noted that, by March, 2000, Pinochet had been the subject of warrants
alleging human rights crimes issued by Spain, Switzerland, Belgium
and France and that, by October, 1998, a Spanish magistrate had issued
an "arrest warrant for Pinochet for crimes of genocide, terrorism and
torture.
68
As a result of Riggs' misconduct and failure to file SARs with
regard to the suspicious activity detailed above, the Department of
Justice assessed a criminal fine against the bank in the amount of $16
64. Id. at 73.
65. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Riggs Bank Enters Guilty Plea and Will
Pay $16 Million Fine for Criminal Failure to Report Numerous Suspicious Transactions
(Jan. 27, 2005), at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/PressReleases/Jan_2005/0530.html (last
visited January 20, 2005) [hereinafter Riggs Press Release].
66. See generally Riggs Statement of Offense, supra note 2.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 4.
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million.69
As with UBS, the Riggs case is unusual. The case involved a
unique bank with a heavy concentration of embassy banking.70 In
addition, Riggs clearly had some customers who were "politically
exposed persons" or "PEPs.' ,71 Along with that, there were allegations
of public corruption and there was a large volume of cash and
international transactions. These are not common attributes for an
average U.S. domestic bank. However, in spite of this, as with the UBS
case, there are a number of lessons to be learned.
First and foremost, regardless of the bank's level of risk, it is
essential for the bank to fully understand its risks and, second, for the
bank to ensure that it can manage those risks. In order to do that, the
bank must know the specific risks that are associated with all of its
products, services and customers. This requires well-documented
account opening procedures, strong customer identification processes
and effective monitoring systems. If the bank does not have adequate
policies and procedures, it will not be able to perform these functions.
Similarly, if the essential components of an adequate BSA program are
missing, it will lead to problems. Further, if the willingness and ability
of the staff and senior management to review potentially suspicious
transactions are lacking, the bank will be left unprotected. Most
importantly, if the leadership and the culture created by senior
management and by the board of directors are not sufficiently focused
on compliance, the rest of the bank will be lax and problems will
inevitably result.
As reflected in both the UBS case and in the Riggs case, having
sufficient internal controls, audit and training are essential. If a bank
loses sight of its obligations to its shareholders and its responsibilities
for complying with laws, rules and regulations, as well as safe and
sound banking practices, and turns a blind eye to the potential
wrongdoing or suspicious conduct of certain customers, it is creating an
irreconcilable conflict. A bank cannot blindly serve its customers and
be able to adhere to its other responsibilities at the same time.
69. Riggs Press Release, supra note 65.
70. PSI report, supra note 45, at 13.
71. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.175(o) (2004).
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IV. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE BSA
Although the BSA has provided for criminal penalties for over
thirty years, only five banks have faced criminal action based on the
failure to file SARs. However, the existence of these cases has created
concern as to whether there will be a continued increase in such cases
and whether these cases have been appropriate.
A. Broadway Case
The first case involving a criminal sanction against a bank for
failure to file a SAR involved Broadway National Bank, New York,
New York. In that case, the bank pled guilty to three criminal counts -
failure to establish or maintain an adequate BSA program, failure to file
SARs and affirmatively assisting customers in structuring cash deposits
in order to evade the BSA reporting requirements. 2 The bank also paid
a criminal fine of $4 million.73
There was little to no adverse reaction to the criminal plea in the
Broadway case and that was, perhaps, because of the overwhelming
egregiousness of the case. As set forth in the United States Attorney's
Office's press release, the case involved thousands of bulk cash and
structured deposits at the bank over a two-year period.74 The deposits
totaled approximately $123 million. In addition, while the bank was
well aware of the deposits, it never investigated them or filed the
necessary SARs.75
The bulk deposits were made primarily by one customer, a Mr.
Alfred Dauber, who had his runner deliver the cash to the bank in duffel
bags "filled with hundred[s] of thousands of dollars in small bills,
wrapped in rubber bands. 76 Almost as part of a bad caricature of a
money launderer, the runner would not even wait for the cash to be
72. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of N.Y., Manhattan
Bank Pleads Guilty to U.S. Criminal Charges for Failure to Report $123 Million in
Suspicious Cash Deposits (Nov. 27, 2002), at http://www.customs.gov/
xp/cgov/newsroom/pressjreleases/archives/legacy/2002/112002/11272002.xml [hereinafter
Broadway Press Release]; Information at 18-21, U.S. v. Broadway National Bank, (2002)
(02 Cr. 1507 (TPG)) (on file with author and NCBI).





NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
counted, but, rather, would leave the duffel bag at the bank and pick it
up - along with his receipt - the next time he made his deposit run to
the bank.77 The money was so voluminous that the tellers had to work
through their lunch hours to count it and they continuously complained
to senior bank management.78 In spite of that, the senior management
not only failed to investigate or put an end to the transactions, they
approved the prompt wiring of the funds to Columbia, Panama and
Miami.79 One of the senior managers approving the wiring of these
funds was also the bank's BSA compliance officer.80 To make matters
even more suspicious, the cash that the runner periodically dropped off
at the bank often did not match the amounts listed on the deposit slips.
81
In this fashion, Dauber made 250 deposits of bulk cash totaling
approximately $46 million.82 And yet the bank never investigated
Dauber or his transactions.83
Dauber claimed that he was involved in the "electronics
business," but the bank did nothing to verify this.84 Dauber claimed that
his business was only a few blocks from the bank, but the bank never
inspected the site.85 In other words, the bank allowed its staff to be tied
up in counting hundreds of thousands of dollars, allowed management
to immediately wire the funds to well-known money laundering havens
(thus, not even getting the use of the money), processed $46 million
deposited in cash in the most suspicious way, failed utterly to verify the
identity of the customer or the true nature of his business and generally
failed to implement a protective anti-money laundering program.
In addition to mishandling the Dauber account relationship, the
bank permitted a number of customers to engage in structuring deposits,
which is the practice of making cash deposits just under the $10,000
threshold in order to evade the reporting requirements for cash
77. Id.
78. Broadway Press Release, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 10, 17, U.S. v. Broadway National
Bank, (2002) (02 Cr. 1507 (TPG)) (on file with author and NCBI).
81. Information at 12, U.S. v. Broadway National Bank, (2002) (02 Cr. 1507 (TPG))
(on file with author and NCBI).






transactions pursuant to the BSA.86 All tolled, there were thousands of
structured deposits that totaled approximately $76 million over the
course of two years.87
One particular account relationship, involving the Fares family,
was of note and was detailed in the United States Attorney's Press
Release and Sentencing Memorandum. 88  Drawing from examples
relating to the Fares' accounts, it was noted that, on one particular day,
January 16, 1998, the Fareses deposited over $167,000 into 17 different
accounts, using nothing but cash deposits of just under $10,000.89
Further, on March 16, 1998, the Fareses make 12 different cash
deposits, all ranging between $8,990 and $9,900. 90 On the very next
day, they made another 12 cash deposits, 11 of which were between
$9,600 and $9,900, with one at $8,500. 9' On the third day, they made
five more cash deposits, four between $9,650 and $9,800, and one at
$8,000.92 In spite of the incredibly obvious nature, volume and
frequency of the structuring, the bank further aggravated the situation
by promptly wiring the funds to Panama and Lebanon.93 In addition,
the bank ignored the fact that the accounts were linked (in the sense of
having the same addresses, the same company officers and the same
account signers), that the deposits were made into different accounts,
but all at the same time, and that the primary business address for most
of the accounts was a small storefront directly across the street from the
bank that could not possibly have legitimately generated the volume of
cash that was deposited on a regular basis into the bank.94 The bank,
however, with one exception, failed to file any SARs and filed only a
few CTRs in connection with the Fares' accounts.95 To aggravate the
situation, Broadway had failed to implement an effective BSA program
86. Id.
87. Broadway Press Release, supra note 72.
88. Id.




93. Broadway Press Release, supra note 72.
94. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 20-21, U.S. v. Broadway National
Bank, (2002) (02 Cr. 1507 (TPG)) (on file with author and NCBI).
95. Id. at 22. The one SAR that was filed was two years before the activity set forth in
the Sentencing Memorandum and occurred only because the bank's outside auditors
identified it and directed the bank to make the filing. Id.
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despite warnings from banking regulators and Broadway's outside
auditors.96
In summary, as the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, James B. Comey, said, "Broadway National Bank
utterly failed to implement any program at all, let alone an effective
one, with the dire result that over approximately $123 million in
narcotics proceeds was laundered through the bank.' 97 This fact alone
makes the Broadway case an outlier. Most banks, as Mr. William Fox,
the Director of FinCEN, has stated, "have good systems in place. 98
Thus, the severe actions, administrative or criminal, appear to be
brought primarily against banks that, in Mr. Fox's description, have
clear BSA system failures, "systems that were nonexistent or weak." 99
Clearly, in order to avoid the mistakes committed by Broadway, banks
must have strong and effective BSA compliance programs, good
internal controls, sufficient monitoring of accounts and transactions,
adequate training, and a program for knowing their customers and the
nature of their businesses. In addition, the Board and senior
management must have a willingness and ability to identify the bank's
high risk customers, services and products and to properly manage the
associated risks.
B. Banco Popular Case
The second case that resulted in a criminal action for the failure
to file a SAR involved Banco Popular de Puerto Rico. In that case, the
bank agreed to a year-long deferred prosecution and paid a civil
forfeiture of $21.6 million.'0° The bank also agreed to pay a $20 million
civil money penalty assessed by FinCEN, which was deemed to be
satisfied by the $21.6 million forfeiture. °1 The facts that justified this
action were serious and stemmed from the bank's lack of monitoring
and failure to react to the "voluminous unusual or suspicious
96. Id. at 7-14.
97. Broadway Press Release, supra note 72.
98. Karen Krebsbach, Fear Factor, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1, 2004, at 32.
99. Id.
100. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, 28-29, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto
Rico, (2003) available at http://www.fincen.gov/bancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2005).
101. Id. at 3.
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transactions" of two customers, as well as from the fact that the bank
was servicing a number of foreign money service businesses located in
the Dominican Republic without sufficient appreciation for the risk and
without conducting adequate due diligence.
10 2
With regard to the first customer, Roberto Ferrario Pozzi, the
bank recorded him as having four different types of businesses: (1)
selling phone cards and long distance telephone, facsimile and money
transmission services; (2) managing a gas station; (3) operating a caf6
by the name of "Gilligans;" and (4) running a business mysteriously
entitled "Puerto Rico Net Yellow." 103  However, the bank never
bothered to determine which, if any, of these lines of business were
accurate or legitimate. So, from the beginning, the bank had no idea
who its customer was.
On top of that, during the course of a three year period, from
June 1995 to March 1998, the customer deposited $20 million in
cash. 1°4 Over the next six months, between March 1998 and September
1998, Ferrario deposited another $8 million in cash.
10 5  The cash
deposits frequently totaled hundreds of thousands of dollars in a single
day and the monthly total of deposits went from $34,000 in August
1995, to an average of $1.4 million for the last six 
months of 1997.106
Similar to Mr. Dauber in the Broadway case, Ferrario on occasion
brought the money into Banco Popular in gym bags.
0 7 And, similar to
the Broadway case, because Ferrario's deposits were in small
denominations, his activity succeeded in disrupting the operations of
Banco Popular due to the time it took the tellers to 
count the cash.108
Management, in fact, was aware of this problem and discussed it at
monthly meetings, but did nothing. 10 9
In addition to the high volume and very unusual nature and
102. See id. at 15.
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id.
105. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 16, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
(2003) available at http://www.fincen.gov/bancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
106. Id. at 16-17. What was almost humorous is the fact that, in one single week in 1995,
the same employee filed three different CTRs with regard to Ferrario's deposits and listed
three separate sources for the funds - "overseas calls, gas station, and money transfer." Id.
at 18-19.
107. Id. at 16.
108. See id. at 17.
109. See id. at 19.
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growth of the cash deposits, Ferrario regularly wired out his funds on
the same day, or within one day, of the deposit." ° This wire activity
was so substantial that it represented 25% of a particular branch's wire
activity."' To make the activity even more suspicious, the wires were
sent to 300 different companies or individuals." 2 One has to wonder
how many gas stations, local cafes, or even "Net Yellow" companies
would require that much wire activity. And yet the bank did not
investigate.' 13
As early as October 1995, an employee told a branch manager
that the transactions were significant and suspicious and yet the bank
did nothing.' 14 In addition, tellers commented that the money deposited
by Ferrario was "strange or unusual," and yet the bank did nothing. ' 5
Further, bank employees regularly walked by Ferrario's purported place
of business on the way to and from work and "rarely saw customers at
the business."' 16
It was not until December 1997, over two years after Ferrario's
suspicious activity began, that the bank started to investigate.' '7 And it
was not until March 1998, that the bank filed its one and only SAR,
which was incomplete and inaccurate. 18
As if Banco Popular's poor record with regard to Ferrario was
not enough, the bank had similar failures with regard to a second
customer, Jairo de Jesus Vallejo, who maintained accounts for two
different businesses." 9 In the one account, the average monthly balance
went from $3,000 to $120,000 in less than one year, representing a 40-
fold increase. 120 In addition, the nature of the deposits into the account
went from being primarily checks to consisting mostly of cash, which
110. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 18, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
(2003) available at http://www.fincen.gov/bancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 17-18.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 19, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
(2003) available at http://www.fincen.gov/bancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 18-19.
118. See id. at 16, 19-20.
119. Id. at 15, 21.
120. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 21, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
(2003) available at http://www.fincen.gov/bancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
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was, according to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, inconsistent
with Vallejo's stated business for this account - distributing hydraulic
equipment. 121
Further, the cash deposits themselves were suspicious and
clearly involved structuring. 22 Vallejo made as many as six deposits a
day at multiple branches, all in amounts under the CTR $10,000 
limit. 123
In fact, the bank's systems identified the structuring, but the bank did
not file a SAR. 124 In closing its investigation into the matter, the bank
noted that the activity stopped, but it had not.
1 25
By the time the bank finally did file SARs on Vallejo's two
accounts, over $1 million had passed through the accounts, which the
bank subsequently learned were the proceeds of narcotics trafficking.
1 26
However, as noted in the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, the SARs
were incomplete in that they did not fully describe the amount of the
activity or the length of time during which the activity was 
conducted.1 27
In addition to the bank's deficiencies with regard to monitoring
the suspicious nature of high-risk, cash-oriented, individual customers,
Banco Popular, for over three years, provided correspondent services to
high-risk foreign money service businesses ("MSBs") located in the
Dominican Republic.1 28  The specific problems in this area were
threefold. First, the bank engaged in this high-risk business without
adequately reviewing and documenting the nature and extent of the
MSBs' activity. 129 Second, the bank processed checks for the MSBs on
a bulk basis without reviewing the transactions for suspicious activity.
1" °
Had it done so, the bank might have been able to identify that the
activity was indicative of money laundering. 13' Third, the bank allowed




124. Id. at 22.
125. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 22, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
(2003) available at http://www.fincen.govlbancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 24.
129. Id. at 24-25.
130. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 25, U.S. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
(2003) available at http://www.fincen.gov/bancopopular.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
131. Id.
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
analysis even after the bank was specifically put on notice by law
enforcement.' 32 In one instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration
issued a warrant seizing $275,000 from an account at the bank. On the
very same day, the bank allowed the account holder's brother to open
another account specifically so that it could serve as a substitute for the
account that had just been seized and closed. 133 This failure to respond
to information provided from outside sources, particularly law
enforcement, was also a contributing problem for the bank with regard
to its handling of both the Ferrario and Vallejo accounts. With regard to
both individuals, the bank received law enforcement subpoenas, but
ignored the obvious need to conduct an independent review of the
accounts that were being subpoenaed.
134
Thus, the Banco Popular case reinforces the need for banks to
have good customer identification programs, systems to monitor for
suspicious transactions and activity, and procedures to follow up and
investigate suspicious activity and the concerns of the officers and
employees of the bank. The bank must also establish procedures to
ensure the coordination and communication necessary to review
transactions and accounts that are potentially the subject of law
enforcement inquiry. Lastly, the bank must have the ability to
understand the risks involved with regard to the products, services and
customers of the bank, and the culture and support to ensure that the
bank has the personnel, knowledge, ability, willingness and internal
controls to manage those risks.
C. Delta Case
In the third criminal case, Delta National Bank, New York, New
York, pled guilty to a one-count information for failure to file a SAR
and agreed to forfeit $950,000.15 Unlike the other cases described
above that involved criminal cases against banks for the failure to file
SARs, the Delta National Bank case is difficult to understand. While
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 19, 22.
135. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Delta National Bank & Trust Company




the bank clearly acknowledged wrongdoing in the plea agreement, the
basis for the plea is unclear.
The U.S. Attorney's Press Release says that Delta National
Bank pled guilty to "one count of failure to file a Suspicious Activity
Report (SAR) in connection with the use of a customer's account for
foreign exchange business, including a June 28, 2000, transaction made
between two accounts at the bank.' 136 As set forth in slightly more
detail later on in the page and one-half press release, the U.S. Attorney's
Office stated:
According to the plea agreement, the Customer assisted
other Colombian customers of Delta National with
transactions in their accounts that were conducted as
part of the foreign currency exchange business. Delta
National was aware of this assistance. Delta National
agreed that the government could produce evidence to
prove that the total amount involved in the Customer's
foreign currency exchange transactions was between $5
million and $10 million.
137
The corresponding press release issued by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) had the identical language, except for the
addition of two phrases highlighted here in italics:
According to the plea agreement, the Customer assisted
other Colombian customers of Delta National with
transactions in their accounts that were conducted as
part of the foreign currency exchange business. Delta
National was aware of this assistance. Delta National
agreed that the government could produce evidence to
prove that the total amount involved in the Customer's
foreign currency exchange transactions that required
reporting was between $5 million and $10 million.138
Delta failed to file these reports.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Delta National Bank &
Trust Company Pleads Guilty after Ice Investigation (Oct. 1, 2003) (emphasis added), at
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Analyzing the U.S. Attorney's Press Release, it is difficult to
determine what is criminal about a bank having a customer who, in turn,
assisted one of its own customers in conducting a "foreign currency
exchange business." While, clearly, there could have been something
criminal related to this matter, the press release does not seem to explain
it. The additional language in the ICE press release at least intimates
that there were reports to be filed that were not. However, the ICE
press release does not explain why the reports (presumably SARs)
should have been filed.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Attorney's criminal information does
not shed much light, saying that the bank:
did knowingly and willfully fail to file a Suspicious
Activity Report.. .pertaining to a June 28, 2000, book
transfer of $50,000 from an account at Delta National
Bank and Trust Company and into account number
600822, which was held at Delta National Bank and
Trust Company under the name 'Vanina.'
It is unclear why the failure to file a solitary SAR involving the internal
book transfer of $50,000 from one account to another is indicative of
criminal misconduct.
The Statement of Facts, or Allocution, in the case stated the
following and only assists the analysis marginally:
* The transaction at issue was part of a pattern of activity
involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period.
* The value of the funds involved, according to the
government's evidence, was more than $5 million and less
than $10 million.
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/newsreleases/articles/deltabankl 001 03.htm (last visited
January 20, 2005).
139. Information at 2, U.S. v. Delta National Bank and Trust Company, (2003) (JFM-03-
0416) (on file with author and NCBI) (omitting footnote referencing the OCC's regulation
requiring banks to file SARs when appropriate).
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" The Bank knew, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the
transaction identified in the Information had no business
purpose.
* The Information identifies a transaction for which the Bank
willfully did not file a Suspicious Activity Report.
* The Bank did not know that the funds were the proceeds of
unlawful activity, but acted with reckless disregard of the
source of the funds.
* Foreign currency exchange businesses in Colombia have
been identified by the Bank's primary regulator, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and other federal
agencies as "high risk" for the involvement of money
laundering of the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and other
criminal activity. During the period mentioned in the
Information, the Bank and its officers were aware of these
risks, and were aware that the Customer was operating such
a business.
" During the period mentioned in the Information, the
Customer assisted other Colombian customers of the Bank
with transactions in their accounts that were conducted as
part of the foreign currency exchange business, and the
Bank was aware of this assistance.
* The Bank agrees that if this case had gone to trial, the
government could produce evidence to prove that two such
transactions, conducted as part of the foreign currency
exchange business, were a $50,000 book transfer on June
28, 2000, and a $65,000 book transfer on July 10, 2000.
* The bank acknowledges that a Suspicious Activity Report
was required to be filed concerning the use of the
Customer's account for foreign currency exchange business,
including the two transactions described above.
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The Bank incorrectly concluded that no Suspicious Activity
Report was required, and, thus, willfully failed to file a
report in violation of the law.
140
First, there is mention of a pattern of conduct involving
$100,000 and an overall value of some unspecified funds ranging from
$5 million to $10 million. However, there is no explanation (as there is
in the other criminal cases described above) what these amounts pertain
to. Further, there is no explanation as to how these relatively large
amounts relate to the relatively small, one-time transfers involving
$50,000 and $65,000, only one of which is referenced in the criminal
information. Granted that the failure to file a SAR when one "knew,
suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transaction identified in the
Information had no business purpose" is a violation of the regulatory
requirements set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii), it is still unclear
why this rose to the level of a criminal case. This is especially the case
when the Information also states that the "Bank did not know that the
funds were the proceeds of unlawful activity, but acted with reckless
disregard of the source of the funds.' 4 1 Specifically, it is not explained
in what way the bank may have engaged in "reckless disregard."
Further, the fact that the particular customer - or, more specifically, the
customer's line of business - is high-risk does not mean that a bank
cannot have such a customer as a client. It simply means that the bank
has to have identified the risk (which, according to the Information, the
bank had done), understood the risk, and established adequate
procedures for supervising and managing the risk. It is unclear how the
bank failed to perform these latter functions and why, assuming it had
failed, it became a criminal matter. Again, while it is clear that the bank
pled guilty to willfully failing to file a SAR, it would have been
preferable to be able to understand what the bank specifically did or did
not do that created criminal liability. What is particularly troubling is
the fact that the very last sentence in the Appendix to the Statement of
Fact (or Allocution) is: "During the period mentioned in the
Information, the Bank incorrectly concluded that no Suspicious Activity
140. Letter, U.S. v. Delta National Bank & Trust Co., Sept. 11, 2003, at 2, 4-5,
Attachment A, at 2-3, (on file with author and NCBI) [hereinafter Statement of Facts].
141. Id. at 4-5.
[Vol. 9
BANK SECRECY ACT
Report was required, and thus willfully failed to file a report in violation
of the law."'142 Ordinarily, an incorrect conclusion, absent aggravating
factors, as to whether to file a SAR, does not and should not create
criminal liability. In this case, it is unclear what the aggravating factors
might have been.
As set forth in two articles at the time of this action, the bank
claimed that: "Prior to this matter, we enjoyed an unblemished
regulatory record, about which we are very proud."
143 These articles
also say the following about the case:
A New York bank agreed... to forfeit $950,000 for
failing to report a series of suspicious transactions that
federal authorities said could have helped fuel a vast
underground system used to launder international drug
profits .... The undercover investigation, dubbed
Operation Laundry Chute, chiefly targeted Colombian
drug traffickers who use a system known as the "Black
Market Peso Exchange" to launder profits from illegal
drug sales. 44
However, as set forth above, there is no mention of the "Black Market
Peso Exchange" or of "a vast underground system" in the U.S.
Attorney's press release, Information or Statement of Facts.
Consequently, there is no way of knowing if these dramatic newspaper
statements are accurate.
In addition, it is curious that The Miami Herald, in its story
about the case, claimed the following:
According to the plea agreement, Delta National opened
an account in 1998 at its Miami branch for a Colombian
who operated a foreign-currency exchange business in
Bogota. Such businesses in Colombia have been
142. Id. Attachment A, at 3.
143. Letter from Pratt, SAR Penalty (Oct. 6, 2003) (on file with author and NCBI);
Gregg Fields, Miami a Stop on Colombian Laundering Trail: A New York-based bank with
a branch in South Florida pleads guilty for activities involving Colombian money brokers,
THE MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2003, at 3C.
144. Gail Gibson, Bank to forfeit $950,000 in money laundering: Miami branch failed to
Report Suspicious Transactions in Drug Case, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 2, 2003, at 3B.
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identified by the U.S. government as high risk for
involvement in money laundering. That classification
required Delta National to file SARs on the account, but
it failed to do so, according to an ICE news release. 145
The first two sentences may well be correct. The last sentence;
however, is not. As stated above, the banking regulators do not impose
prohibitions on whom a bank may have as a customer. Unfortunately,
such news stories only serve to confuse matters.
It would appear that, due to the lack of details provided by the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the Delta case, there are not very many
lessons, if any, to be learned. It is clear that there was some criminality
alleged by the prosecutor and acknowledged by the bank, but it is not
clear what the criminality, or the bank's misconduct, was. The one
lesson that, perhaps, can be deduced from this case is the importance of
a bank knowing its customers and its customers' businesses and the
need for the bank to exercise enhanced due diligence with regard to all
of its high-risk customers.
D. Amsouth Case
Several months after the UBS and Riggs administrative cases,
on October 12, 2004, the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of Mississippi announced a settlement with AmSouth
Bank, Birmingham, Alabama, consisting of the forfeiture of $40 million
to the United States as part of a deferred prosecution agreement. 46 On
the same day, the Federal Reserve and FinCEN announced the joint
assessment of a $10 million civil money penalty against the bank. 47
145. Fields, supra note 143, at 3C.
146. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, U.S. v. AmSouth Bancorporation and
Amsouth Bank (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mss/documents/press
releases/october2004/was 15759061.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
147. Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Civil money penalty against Amsouth Bank
of Birmingham (Oct. 12, 2004), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
press/enforcement/2004/20041012/default.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
Amsouth Federal Reserve Press Release]; Federal Reserve Board Cease and Desist Order
and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of Amsouth
Bancorporation and Amsouth Bank, Bd. Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. at II (Oct. 12,2004) (on file with author and NCBI) [hereinafter Amsouth Cease and Desist Order];
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Assessment of Civil Money Penalty No. 2004-2, In
the Matter of Amsouth Bank, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network at 9 (Oct. 12, 2004),
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Again, the question is raised as to what caused such a large forfeiture
and accompanying penalty?
The simple answer, as set forth in the U.S. Attorney's Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, is that the bank pled guilty to "one count ... of
failing to file suspicious activity reports in a timely, complete and
accurate manner, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(g)(1) and 5322(b)
and 31 C.F.R. § 103.18.,' 148  However, the Statement of Facts that
accompanied the Agreement and which the bank "accept[ed] and
acknowledge[d],, 149 reflects a more involved story.
This case, however, has been very controversial. Specifically, a
former General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, David
Aufhauser, has termed the case "a hijacking of a regulatory issue."'
' 50 In
addition, William Fox, the Director of FinCEN, in referring to this case,
has said that he had "very serious concerns about what appears to be a
trend to criminalize behavior designed to be governed by civil
standards., 1 5' The concern voiced is perhaps based on the question that
could be asked about the Delta case discussed immediately above. That
question is whether the failure to file a single SAR (which is at first
blush simply a regulatory requirement) or, alternatively, the failure to
correctly conclude that a SAR is required to be filed, will or should
result in criminal charges. This is a difficult issue, but - aside
potentially from the Delta case - the other cases detailed in this article,
including the AmSouth case, involved much more than the failure to file
a single SAR.
As set forth in the Department of Justice's press release, the
case emanates from the fact that the bank allowed $20 million to flow
through its accounts in a Ponzi scheme that defrauded approximately 60
customers of their savings.15 In addition to not adequately performing
available at http://www.fincen.gov/amsouthassessmentcivilmoney.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN
Amsouth Assessment].
148. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, U.S. v. AmSouth Bancorporation and
Amsouth Bank, (2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mss/documents/
pressreleases/october200
4 /was 15759061 .pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
149. Id.
150. Rob Blackwell, Amsouth Case has Industry on Edge, 169 AM. BANKER, Nov. 9,
2004, at 1, 4.
151. Id.
152. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Amsouth Bank Agrees to Forfeit $40
Million (Oct. 12, 2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mss/documents/pressreleases
/october2004/amprsrels.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
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due diligence, the bank had in its possession - and was apparently
aware of - promotional materials relating to the scheme which indicated
that the investors were being promised an investment return of up to
25% a month 53 - a virtual impossibility. It would appear that this
should have been identified and reported as suspicious, especially in
light of the amount of money involved. Further, according to the
Department of Justice's Statement of Facts, the bank engaged in
questionable conduct by providing blank account opening documents to
the two perpetrators of the scheme so that they could open accounts for
individuals the bank did not meet and whose identities the bank did not
verify.1 54 The bank further failed to comply with the instructions and
restrictions set forth in the "Direction of Investment" forms signed by
the underlying customers and, without the knowledge or consent of the
customers, provided copies of their bank statements to the two
perpetrators of the Ponzi scheme. 55 Perhaps even more problematic
was the fact that the bank refused or was unable to adequately respond
to a series of grand jury subpoenas.1 56 Specifically, the bank "(i) failed
to timely produce certain documents called for" by the grand jury
subpoenas; "(ii) failed to produce certain documents in the manner they
were kept in the regular course of business as required by the
subpoenas; and (iii) failed to locate and produce certain documents
called for by the subpoenas."'157 In fact, the bank failed to locate and
produce certain documents until after it had become a target of the
criminal investigation.1 58 Naturally, any bank that treats grand jury
subpoenas in such a cavalier fashion is apt to be asking for problems. A
similar lack of responsiveness was an issue in both the UBS and Riggs
cases.
To make matters worse, according to the Department of
Justice's Statement of Facts, the bank's inside counsel failed to search
even his own files and did not bother to request documents of
153. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Amsouth Statement of Facts, Oct. 12, 2004 at 6, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mss/documents/pressreleases/october2004/was 15758841 .pdf
(last visited Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Amsouth Statement of Facts].
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. at 5-6.
156. Id. at 7-8.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Amsouth Statement of Facts, supra note 153, at 9.
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employees he knew or should have known had responsive 
documents.1 59
Last, the bank's outside counsel, according to the Statement of Facts,
provided misleading responses to the U.S. Attorney's Office in
connection with the grand jury subpoenas and failed to ensure, even
after "many discussions and other communications" with the U.S.
Attorney's Office, that the bank had produced all responsive documents
on a timely basis.' 60 Again, this lack of responsiveness is a formula for
disaster. Even if there is an argument that the action by the U.S.
Attorney's Office was inappropriate or somehow improperly crossed
over into the "regulatory" arena, it is clear that AmSouth made a
number of serious missteps and failed to respond to an ongoing grand
jury investigation in a full, complete and cooperative fashion. No
matter what trouble the bank has gotten into, or what defenses it might
have, it is absolutely essential for it to cooperate with the U.S.
Attorney's Office and its regulators to the fullest extent possible.
According to the Federal Reserve's press release, there were
"systemic defects in AmSouth's program with respect to internal
controls, employee training, and independent review that resulted in
failures to identify, analyze and report suspicious activity occurring at
the bank."' 6 1 In addition, in the Federal Reserve's Cease and Desist
Order and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty, the
"whereas" clauses recite that the bank: (a) failed to "establish and
maintain procedures reasonably designed to [ensure] and monitor
compliance with the BSA;" (b) failed to "file accurate, complete, or
timely Suspicious Activity Reports;" and (c) failed "to have adequate
systems in place to prevent, identify, and report criminal activity...
and [failed] to promptly and fully cooperate with law enforcement
authorities .... ,162 Similarly, FinCEN's Assessment of Civil Money
Penalty stated that:
AmSouth willfully violated the anti-money laundering
program and suspicious activity reporting requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing
regulations. AmSouth failed to develop an anti-money
159. Id. at 8.
160. Id. at9.
161. Amsouth Federal Reserve Press Release, supra note 147, at 1.
162. Amsouth Cease and Desist Order, supra note 147, at 2.
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laundering program tailored to the risks of its business
and reasonably designed, as required by law, to prevent
the Bank from being used to launder money and finance
terrorist activities and to ensure compliance with the
Bank Secrecy Act. AmSouth's program lacked
adequate board and management oversight, lacked fully
implemented policies and procedures across the Bank to
provide for appropriate due diligence and capture of
suspicious activity information, lacked adequate training
to ensure compliance, and had a materially deficient
internal audit process that failed to detect these
inadequacies. The result was a fragmented program in
which areas of the Bank had information on suspicious
activity that was never communicated to those
responsible for Bank Secrecy Act compliance....
FinCEN has determined that AmSouth's program was
materially deficient in three of the four required
elements: internal controls, training, [and] audit. 163
This is a very poor record and is reflective of the lack of internal
controls and adequate BSA program alleged to have existed at UBS,
Riggs, Broadway and Banco Popular.
In addition, AmSouth had no system in place to alert BSA
compliance personnel to the existence of subpoenas, and the bank had
no policies and procedures to ensure the referral, investigation and
reporting of suspicious activities. 64  These deficiencies became
important with regard to the specific matter that gave rise to the
forfeiture and penalty because the two men running the Ponzi scheme
were relatively well-known to the bank; employees and officers in
seven different branches in four different states had contact with the two
individuals during the course of the scheme.1 65 Further, at least one
employee had suspicions that there was an illegal scheme being
perpetrated and reported his concerns to both the bank's legal
department and Corporate Security department. 166 Yet neither of these
163. FinCEN Amsouth Assessment, supra note 147, at 1-3.
164. Id. at 3-4.




divisions followed up and investigated.
167
In addition to the failure by AmSouth to identify, investigate
and/or report the Ponzi scheme that was at the heart of the criminal and
administrative case, it should be noted that both the U.S. Attorney's
Statement of Facts and the FinCEN Assessment of a Civil Money
Penalty recite a series of four to eight instances in which the bank failed
to report other known or obvious suspicious transactions.
168 Some of
these transactions involved millions of dollars and reflect the bank's
failure to respond to or investigate the concerns of bank employees, as
well as very basic flaws in the bank's training program.
69 On the latter
point, it was noted in the Statement of Facts and the FinCEN
Assessment that AmSouth incorrectly believed that: if it reported the
transaction to the NASD, the bank did not need to file a SAR; if the
matter involved civil litigation, the bank did not need to file a SAR; if it
reported the matter to law enforcement by phone, the bank did not need
to file a SAR; if the suspect were dead, the bank did not need to file a
SAR (even though others might also be involved); and, last, if it did not
suffer a loss, the bank did not need to file a SAR.
7° This lack of
understanding and training reflects poorly on senior management of the
bank and its board of directors and makes it difficult for the bank to
assert that it had a good BSA compliance process.
While, as stated above, the AmSouth case is controversial, the
bank clearly did not have an adequate BSA and anti-money laundering
program and did not have an adequate process for understanding the
standards for filing SARs, or even for identifying and reviewing
potentially suspicious activities. In addition, as described above, the
case does not appear to have been based on the bank's failure to file a
solitary SAR. As the Assistant United States Attorney handling the
case was quoted as saying: "bankers would be wrong to think the case
was just about a failure to file reports. 'If you read the documents
carefully, there was a lot going on with this bank other than not filing
one SAR.... There are other charges that could have been brought
against this bank." 7'' '
167. Id.
168. Id. at 12-13; FinCEN Amsouth Assessment, supra note 147, at 6-8.
169. FinCEN Amsouth Assessment, supra note 147, at 6-8.
170. Id.
171. Blackwell, supra note 50, at4.
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This understanding was reflected in comments made by Daniel
P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency:
Since the SARs system was introduced less than a
decade ago .... it 'was never designed to be a gotcha
game.' . . Stipano said some of the recent scandals
involving failures to file SARs could be considered
'misnomers' because they really involved much larger
money laundering violations .... The convenient plea to
cop to is a criminal violation of BSA. Criminal failure
to file SARs is part of BSA, so it makes it look
like.. .you're being dinged for not filing SARs, when in
fact the problems were really much greater than that. 172
As William Fox, Director of FinCEN, said with regard to the
Riggs and AmSouth cases: "The danger is that the institutions misread
what these actions are all about. It's so important to understand that in
each of these cases, there were clearly systems failures, systems that
were nonexistent or weak, as opposed to most institutions, we think,
that have good systems in place."''7 3
Consequently, it would appear that the sound message to take
away from the AmSouth case, as well as the other cases detailed above,
is that it is essential to have a culture within the bank that will ensure
strong internal controls, a good BSA compliance program, an adequate
system to investigate and report suspicious activity, an ability to
monitor transactions and a willingness to respond to concerns and
inquiries from officers and employees within the bank, as well as from
outside sources, including law enforcement agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
The cases described above serve primarily to underscore the
need for all banks to have a strong BSA compliance program. Failure
to do so is obviously fraught with risk. While criminal liability for
172. Richard Cowden, In Age of 'Zero Tolerance' Banks, Agencies Look to Strike
Balance on Proper SARs Filing, 83 BNA BANKING REPORT, Nov. 1, 2004, at 660.
173. Krebsbach, supra note 98,at 38.
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banks is relatively rare,174 it has increased in recent years. In addition,
there is the risk of administrative actions for BSA compliance failures
that can involve the imposition of a cease and desist order, 7 5 as well as
the assessment of a large civil money penalty by the banking agency or
by FinCEN. 1
76
In spite of these risks, though, it should be noted, as William
Fox, Director of FinCEN, has said, "failures in compliance are by no
means emblematic of the financial industry as a whole which functions
well in complying with its anti-money laundering reporting
requirements.' 77  These words echo what he said with regard to the
Riggs and AmSouth cases: "The danger is that the institutions misread
what these actions are all about. It's so important to understand that in
each of these cases, there were clearly systems failures, systems that
174. See Cowden, supra note 172, at 660. Lester M. Joseph, Principal Deputy Chief of
the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, has stated that
there have been only four banks that have faced criminal action based on the failure to file
SARs: Broadway National Bank, AmSouth Bank, Banco Popular and Delta National Bank.
With the recent criminal plea by Riggs, the count is now five. Id.
175. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s)(2000) which requires the imposition of a cease and desist
order whenever a bank "has failed to establish and maintain the [BSA] procedures [required
by each federal banking agency] or has failed to correct any problem with the procedures
maintained by such depository institution which was previously reported to the depository
institution by such agency" Id; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s)(3)(2000).
176. In the recent past, there have been three large civil money penalties cases other than
the ones discussed above. Great Eastern Bank of Florida, Miami, Florida, was assessed
$100,000 by FinCEN on Sept. 4, 2002, for failure to file SARs on six different customers
who were engaging in large and suspicious back-to-back wire activity, depositing large
amounts of cash followed by international wire activity and depositing a large volume of
sequentially numbered money orders and travelers checks. See Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of Great Eastern
Bank of Florida, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Sept. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/geassessfinal.pdf. Western Union Financial Services, Inc. was fined
$8 million by the State of New York and an additional $3 million by FinCEN on March 6,
2003, for failure to aggregate multiple cash transactions among different Western Union
agents, which resulted in a failure to file CTRs and SARs. See Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network Assessment of Civil Money Penalty and Undertakings, In the Matter
of Western Union Financial Services, Inc., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Mar. 6,
2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/westernunion-assessment.pdf. Korea Exchange
Bank, New York, New York, was assessed a 1.1 million civil money penalty by FinCEN for
failure to file 39 SARs involving $32 million in cash deposits that were wired out of the
bank shortly after being deposited, for failure to file reports for ten months pursuant to the
wire transfer rule involving transfers of $3,000 or more and failure to properly report 65
wire transfers just under the $3,000 reporting rules. See Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of Korean Exchange Bank,
Finanacial Crimes Enforcement Network (June 24, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/koreaexchangeassessment.pdf.
177. FinCEN Riggs Press Release, supra note 32.
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were nonexistent or weak, as opposed to most institutions, we think,
that have good systems in place." 178  As set forth in one article:
"compliance often requires consideration of much detail, but with a bit
of planning and foresight any bank can get it right."
' 179
The OCC has issued a guide for bankers entitled "Money
Laundering: A Banker's Guide to Avoiding Problems., 180 This booklet
contains a lot of helpful information and detailed explanations, such as:
Comprehensive customer due diligence programs are
banks' most effective weapons against being used
unwittingly to launder money or to support terrorist
financing. Knowing customers, including depositors
and other users of bank services, requiring appropriate
identification, and being alert to unusual or suspicious
transactions can help deter and detect money laundering
and terrorist financing schemes. Effective due diligence
systems are also fundamental to help ensure compliance
with suspicious activity reporting regulations.' 8'
An effective BSA compliance program includes controls
178. Krebsbach, supra note 98, at 38.
179. Mollie N. Sudhoff and Lucy H. Griffin, BSA confusion got you coming and going?,
96 A.B.A. BANKING JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2004, at 74.
180. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Money Laundering: A Banker's Guide
to Avoiding Problems (Dec. 2002), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/moneylaundering2002.pdf
(last visited January 20, 2005) [hereinafter Money Laundering Guide]. It should also be
noted that the OCC has issued a number of Advisories on the issue of BSA (including,
Advisory 2000-03, Common BSA Compliance Deficiencies, April, 2000; 2002-12, USA
Patriot Act AML Provisions, October, 2001; 2002-04, Detecting Terrorist Financing, May,
2002; and 2004-07, Money Service Businesses, June, 2004). The OCC has also issued
relevant Bulletins (including Bulletin 2000-19, Suspicious Activity Report, June, 2000;
2001-7, Foreign Official Corruption Guidance, February, 2001; 2003-27, Revised
Suspicious Activity Report, June, 2003; 2003-43, BSA Examination Procedures, October,
2003; 2003-48, Revised Currency Transaction Reporting Form, December, 2003; 2004-03,
FAQ - Customer Identification Program Rule, January, 2004; 2004-26, Embassy Accounts,
June, 2004; and 2004-34, Customer ID Program Exam Procedures, July, 2004). Further,
there are the following two publications available: Guidance on Enhanced Scrutiny For
Transactions That May Involve Proceeds of Foreign Official Corruption, Departments of
Treasury and State and Federal Bank Regulators (January, 2001); and Guidance on
Accepting Accounts for Foreign Governments, Foreign Embassies and Foreign Political
Figures, Federal Bank Regulators (June, 2004). See generally Office of Comptroller of the
Currency Advisory Letters, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/advlst05.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2005).
181. Money Laundering Guide, supra note 180, at 9.
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and measures to identify and report suspicious
transactions promptly. Financial institutions must
employ appropriate customer due diligence to
effectively evaluate transactions and conclude whether
to file a suspicious activity report.
82
Bank anti-money laundering programs should be
structured to address the controls needed based on the
risks posed by the products and services offered,
customers served, and geographies. The following are
examples of high-risk products and services, customers,
and geographic locations of which banks should be
aware when developing a risk-based anti-money
laundering program. 
183
The Banker's Guide provides the following examples:
* High-Risk Products and Services
e Wire transfers / International correspondent banking
* Private banking relationships
* Electronic banking
* High-Risk Customers
* Nonbank financial institutions, including Money Service
Businesses
" Non-governmental organizations (e.g., charitable organizations)
* Offshore corporations, bearer share corporations, and banks
located in tax and/or secrecy havens and jurisdictions
designated as non-cooperative in the fight against money
laundering
" Cash-intensive businesses (convenience stores, parking garages,
restaurants, retail stores)
* High-Risk Geographic Locations
* Jurisdictions identified by intergovernmental organizations (e.g.,
182. Id. at 12.
183. Id. at 13.
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Financial Action Task Force or FATF) as non-cooperative in the
fight against money laundering (commonly known as non-
cooperative countries and territories or NCCT)
* Countries or jurisdictions identified by the U.S. Department of
State's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) as being a "primary concern" for narcotics trafficking
and/or money laundering
* Geographies identified by OFAC
* Jurisdictions designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as
being of primary money laundering concern, as authorized by
§ 311 of the USA Patriot Act
* Jurisdictions identified by bank management." 4
The OCC Guide also lists various red flags that banks should be
aware of. '85 In creating its own "best practices" and BSA compliance
program, a bank should look at these factors and, moreover, concentrate
on the risk posed by its products, services and customers, ensure that it
understands and can manage those risks. The most important single
factor is the establishment of a strong culture by the board of directors
and senior management of the bank to create and adhere to an
appropriate and adequate anti-money laundering program. Banks
should recognize the increased attention being paid to anti-money
laundering enforcement by bank regulators, FinCEN, and federal
prosecutors. The risk of criminal prosecution, substantial civil money
penalties, and the loss of reputation are significant, as the cases detailed
above demonstrate, and banks should respond with renewed efforts to
develop and maintain adequate BSA programs.
184. Id. at 13-17.
185. Id. at 18-23.
[Vol. 9
